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President Carter's surprise announcement on Dec. 15, 1978, that the United 
States would establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
China (P.R.C.) as of Jan. 1, 1979, would break its diplomatic ties with the 
Nationalist Chinese administration on Taiwan on that date, and would 
terminate its defense treaty with Taiwan a year later presented Congress with 
several legal, economic, and strategic concerns regarding future U.S. 
relations with China and with Taiwan. In general, these issues focused on 
the following three questions: 
(1) How would the United States continue current commercial 
(including arms sales), cultural, and other forms of 
interchange with Taiwan in the wake of the break in official 
diplomatic relations? 
(2) What legislative actions were likely to be required in order 
to normalize commercial and other interchanges with the P.R.C. 
following the normalization of Sino-American diplomatic 
relations? 
(3) What should be the direction of future 
U.S. relations -- especially military ties -- toward 
China, and what effect would changed relations with the P.R.C. 
and Taiwan have on other important American foreign and defense 
policy concerns, especially vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.? 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
President Carterqs decision was designed to put an end to the Taiwan issue 
as an impediment to normal Sino-American diplomatic relations. The Taiwan 
question had remained the major stumbling block between Washington and Peking 
following President Nixon's landmark visit to the P.R.C. in February 1972. 
At that time, Nixon and Chinese leaders signed the Shanghai Communique, which 
deferred problems of diplomatic relations and Taiwan for the sake of working 
together on the basis of common Sino-American strategic interests in Asian 
and world affairs. In particular, the two sides pledged to cooperate to 
insure that the East Asian region would not become subject to international 
"hegemonyw -- a code word used by China to denote Soviet expansion. 
Prospects for such cooperation had been enhanced during the Nixon 
Administration by the reduction of the U.S. military role in Vietnam and by 
the scaling down of the U.S. military pressure along China's periphery in 
East Asia. Peking, for its part, was actively searching for increased 
support against the Soviet Union. The Chinese had been facing heavy Soviet 
military pressure since the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. By the turn 
of the decade, they viewed the Soviet Union as China's major adversary and 
saw the United States as a source of useful leverage against the Soviet 
"threat. 
Over the next five years, the Nixon and Ford Administrations emphasized 
common U.S.-P.R.C. strategic interests in opposition to international 
qqhegemony,R and encouraged closer U.S. contacts with the P.R.C. without 
significantly altering formal U.S. diplomatic and defense ties with Taiwan. 
This policy seemed acceptable to China and relations gradually improved. In 
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particular, Peking saw the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from East Asia 
- - under terms of the Nixon doctrine -- as conducive to a slow expansion sf 
Chinese influence in the region. At the same time, it was important to 
Peking that the United States avoid a precipitous pullback and maintain 
sufficient forces in the area -- especially naval and air forces -- to help 
China offset possible Soviet expansion in Asia. Also, Peking urged the 
United States to vigilantly check Soviet moves in Europe and the Middle East, 
thereby compelling the U.S.S.R. to focus its strategic attention westward, 
away from China. 
Minor problems arose in Sino-U.S. relations during 1974, apparently 
because of leadership debate in China between vmoderates,w led by Premier 
Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, and more "radicalw leaders led 
by leftists Chinese Politburo members Chang Chun-chiao and Chiang Ching. The 
debate focused on domestic issues, but it also affected foreign policy, 
including policy toward the United States. Maols death in September 1976 was 
followed in a few weeks by the purge of Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching, and 
two other leftist Chinese Politburo members. 
The purge of the leftists and the advent of the Carter Administration in 
January 1977 were accompanied by a return to greater moderation and smoother 
functioning in Sino-U.S. relations. Peking soft-pedaled criticizing the 
United States over the normalization issue and demonstrated marked pragmatism 
in other areas of foreign affairs, notably by increasing economic and 
political ties with Japan and Western Europe, while ending longstanding aid 
programs and political Support for former ideological allies like Vietnam and 
Albania. 
The Carter Administration, for its part, reaffirmed its intention to work 
for the full normalization of U.S.-P.R.C. relations. As Soviet-American 
relations encountered difficulties over arms control, Soviet policy in 
Africa, and human rights, a number of U.S. leaders in and outside of 
government advocated a closer relationship with China as a means to pressure 
the U.S.S.R. into a more accommodating posture toward the United States. 
Perhaps with this in mind, U.S. leaders emphasized parallel strategic - 
interests with China during the visit of National Security Adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski to Peking in May 1978, and they subsequently stepped up technical 
exchanges and trade with China while limiting similar interaction with the 
Soviet Union. In response, Soviet leaders strongly warned the United States 
against trying to "play the Chinese card1' in its relations with the U.S.S.R. 
Meanwhile, U.S. economic relations with Taiwan remained close, even though 
political ties became increasingly cool and the U.S. gradually withdrew its 
military forces stationed on the island. U.S.-Taiwan trade continued to grow 
rapidly; its annual value in recent years has been several times the annual 
value of U.S. trade with the P.R.C. 
President Carter's Decision 
Peking leaders had long demanded that the United States meet three 
conditions for the normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations; the 
United States must withdraw all military forces from Taiwan, break diplomatic 
relations with the government on Taiwan, and terminate the U.S.-Taiwan 
defense treaty. At the same time, the leaders had urged the United States to 
follow the example of Japan's normalization of relations with the P.R.C. in 
September 1972. The so-called "Japanese formula" required the United States 
to end diplomatic relations with the Taipei government, recognize Peking as 
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the sole legal government of China, and acknowledge Peking's claim that 
Taiwan is part of China. This approach foretold the ending of the 
U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty, but U.S. economic relations with Taiwan would 
continue unhindered and political relations were to be maintained through 
private offices staffed by career foreign service officers who are officially 
"retired," "separated,'' or "on leave." 
President Carter's Dec. 15, 1978 speech made clear that the United States 
would meet Peking's three conditions and that it would follow the Japanese 
formula with few modifications. The United States did not immediately 
terminate the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty, but rather notified Taiwan that the 
mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan is to be 
terminated one year from Jan. 1, 1979, in accord with the provisions of the 
treaty. And, Administration spokesmen told the press after the President's 
announcement that the United States would continue during 1979 to deliver 
military equipment already contracted for by Taiwan, and that even after 
formal military ties end, the United States would continue to make available 
to Taiwan "selected defense weaponry" on a "restricted basis." 
The Chinese leaders in Peking hailed the Sino-American agreement on 
normalization, with Premier Hua Guofeng holding his first press conference in 
order to welcome the accord. In Taipei, Chinese Nationalist leaders bitterly 
condemned the President's "sell-out," while some anti-American demonstrations 
were held in the city. Reactions of most major foreign governments were 
mild. 
U.S. and P.R.C. leaders hailed the normalization of their diplomatic 
relations during Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to the United 
States from Jan. 29 to Feb. 4, 1979. The two sides announced in a joint 
press communique that they had agreed to conclude trade, aviation, and 
shipping agreements, and they used the communique to reiterate their joint 
opposition to international "hegemony." 
Future Relations with Taiwan 
There appeared to be three major issues involved in future U.S.-Taiwan 
relations: (1) the maintenance of continued -- albeit unofficial -- 
political ties; (2) U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; and (3) continued trade with 
and continued U.S. private investment in Taiwan. This third issue includes 
the continued application of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and of the 
generalized system of preferences (GSP) to Taiwan, the extension of 
Export-Import loans to Taiwan, and investment guarantees provided by the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to U.S. firms investing in 
Taiwan. 
The Administration prepared a package of legislation and submitted it to 
Congress as an "omnibus bill" in January 1979. Provisions for continuance of 
unofficial political ties, as expected, were similar to the Japanese formula 
for maintaining ties with Taiwan. The Administration's bill called for the 
establishment of a nonprofit private corporation, to be called the American 
Institute in Taiwan, which would carry out programs, transactions or other 
relations previously conducted by the U.S. embassy. Government funds would 
be appropriated for the Institute to carry out these functions, and it would 
be staffed by personnel separated from government service but eligible for 
reinstatement with full career benefits after termination of employment with 
the Institute. 
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The.proposed legislation also provided that legal requirements for the 
maintainance of diplomatic relations with the U.S. will not bar the people on 
Taiwan from eligibility in programs under U.S. law; specified that laws, 
regulations and orders which refer or relate to "foreign governments" would 
continue to apply to the people on Taiwan; and provided for dealing with the 
people on Taiwan through an instrumentality established on their behalf. 
These provisions were intended to confirm the continued eligibility of the 
people on Taiwan under the Arms Export-Import Bank Act, the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, and other legislation. 
The Role of Congress 
Congressional reaction to the Administration's decision and proposed 
legislation was mixed, with an overwhelming majority of Members judging that 
at least some special congressional efforts were needed in order to change 
several aspects of the Administration's new policy toward China and Taiwan* 
Few Members opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking, as 
most agreed with the arguments of Administration spokesmen that this was a 
goal that had been widely accepted in the United States since Nixon's trip to 
China in 1972. Rather, the Members were Concerned over what they saw as the 
inadequacies in the Administration's handling of the normalization question. 
They adopted the view that the issue of whether to recognize the P.R.C. was 
not the central question; the important point focused on what some Members - 
called the "practical implications" of normalization -- questions concerning 
the timing and the method of normalization and especially its impact on 
Taiwan and broader U.S. foreign policy interests. In these respects, they 
judged that the Administration had not done a good job. 
The Congress used deliberations and legislative action during the debate 
on the Taiwan bill in order to register their dissatisfaction and to make 
numerous amendments and changes. Although the congressional actions focusea 
on future U.S. relations with Taiwan, they also showed concern over U.S, 
policy toward China and Asia in general, and over the problem and prospects 
of Executive-Legislative interaction in the conduct of American foreign 
policy. Thus, for example, many Members were especially critical of the 
"haste" of the Carter Administration in coming to agreement with China 
without allowing for adequate consultations with Congress. 
Against the background of signs of friction between the Administration and 
the Congress over the style of the new American China policy, the Congress 
set to work to modify several substantive aspects of the Taiwan relations 
bill. In broad terms, Congress judged that the bill did not give sufficient 
attention to U.S. security interests in Taiwan and the Western Pacific, 
failed to treat adequately aspects of future U.S.-Taiwan economic relations, 
slighted a number of important legal questions regarding relations with 
Taiwan, and avoided providing for strong congressional oversight of 
U.S.-Taiwan ties. 
1. Security Issues. Congress showed particular concern that the 
official American break with Taiwan might be misinterpreted in Asia and 
elsewhere as a pa-rt of a continuing American withdrawal from commitments in 
East Asia following the failure of U.S. efforts in Indochina in the mid 
1970s. Some Members judged that the Carter Administration's "hastyfq 
normalization decision, without consulting closely with U.S. allies in Asia, 
could have given an impression that the United States was not concerned with 
the fate of its allies in the area and could not be counted on for future 
security support. Thus, after heated discussion and consideration of several 
different proposals in both Houses, the Congress decided to add language to 
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the Taiwan Relations Act that would demonstrate more clearly the American 
commitment to support the security of the people on Taiwan and to maintain an 
active interest in backing U.S. allies elsewhere in the region. In sections 
2 and 3 of the Act, Congress added a number of declarations of policy which, 
among other things, affirmed that it is the policy of the United States: 
-- to declare that the peace and security of the Western 
Pacific are in the interests of the United States; 
- - to make clear that the United States expects that the 
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; 
- - to consider any nonpeaceful effort against Taiwan -- including 
boycotts and embargoes -- as a threat to the peace of the 
Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States; 
- - to provide Taiwan With enough defensive arms to maintain 
a sufficient self-defense capability; and 
-- to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist 
any resort to force or other coercion that would jeopardize 
Taiwan's well being. 
To assure that this policy was fully carried out, the Congress specified 
in the Act that the Congress, along with the President, would determine the 
types and quantities of defensive arms and services to be provided to Taiwan 
and that the President must inform the Congress promptly of any threat to 
Taiwan's well being. 
2. Economic and Legal Questions. Congress adopted a number of 
changes in the legislation designed to place U.S.-Taiwan ties on firmer legal 
ground. Regarding economic issues, Congress added provisions which allowed 
American investors in Taiwan to continue to receive guarantees from the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), even though Taiwan's annual 
per capita income of about $1,300 surpassed the $1,000 ceiling normally 
imposed by OPIC. Congress.also added language which specifically allowed for 
"the continued transfer of nuclear power supplies and technologyn to Taiwan, 
and it added the wording noted earlier in regard to U.S. opposition to 
embargoes and boycotts of Taiwan, which was designed to support continued 
prosperity on the island and the growth of U.S.-Taiwan economic interchange. 
Congress also specified that the end of U.S. official ties with Taiwan should 
not be seen as a basis for supporting the exclusion of Taiwan from continued 
membership in international financial institutions or any other international 
organization. 
On other legal matters, Congress added provisions which explicitly noted 
Taiwan's ability to sue and be sued in U.S. courts, stated how Taiwan should 
be treated under terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and set forth 
in more detail the services to be provided by the AIT to American citizens in 
Taiwan. The Congress also requested that the President grant the counterpart 
Taiwan instrumentality -- known as the Coordinating Council for North 
American Affairs (CCNNA) -- the same number of offices in the United States 
as the Taipei government had prior to Jan. 1, 1979, and it authorized the 
President to grant privileges and immunities to Taiwan personnel in the 
United States equivalent to those granted AIT personnel in Taiwan. Congress 
also held that the U.S. swtich of recognition should not be seen as affecting 
Taiwan's assets in the United States. And Congress added a precise 
definition of the term "Taiwan" to include the governing authorities on the 
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island recognized by the United States prior to Jan. 1 ,  1979 -- an addition 
which was designed to strengthen the Taiwan government's standing under U.S. 
law. 
The issue of human rights in Taiwan was repeatedly mentioned during the 
course of the hearings and deliberations on the bill, and Congress decided to 
add a provision to section 2 of the Act reaffirming American interest in the 
human rights of the inhabitants of Taiwan and asserting that nothing in the 
Act should be seen a s  opposed to that interest. 
Some Members of Congress, led by Senator Goldwater, took particular issue 
with President Carter's legal claim to the fight to terminate the mutual 
security treaty with Taiwan without the approval of Congress. Filing suit in 
Federal Court in Washington, D.C., the Senator and other plaintiffs were 
successful in their case before Judge Oliver Gasch, who ruled on Oct. 1 7 ,  
1979, that President Carter had acted unconstitutionally in deciding to end 
the security treaty without the approval of either two-thirds of the Senate 
or both Houses of Congress. The Carter Administration promptly filed an 
appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals, hoping to have Judge Gasch's decision 
overturned before Jan. 1, 1980, when the security treaty with Taiwan was 
scheduled to end under terms of the normalization agreement with Peking. The 
Court of Appeals overturned Judge Gasch's decision on Nov. 30, 1979, but 
lawyers for Senator Goldwater appealed the matter to the Supreme Court. On 
Dec. 13, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, and ordered the district court to dismiss the complaint as 
either not ripe for judicial review or as a political question, thereby 
opening the way for the termination of the treaty at the turn of the year. 
3. Congressional Oversight. Congress added several amendments which 
explicitly gave Congress a strong role in the oversight and supervision of 
U.S.-Taiwan relations. Not only did the Congress add language requiring that 
it be promptly informed by the President of any threat to Taiwan, but it set 
up other reporting procedures. Thus, for example, section 12 of the Act said 
that agreements made by the AIT will be subject to congressional 
notification, reveiw and approval procedures, and that the Secretary of State 
is required to make semi-annual reports to the Congress on the status of 
U.S.-Taiwan relations during a 2-year period following the effective date of 
the Act. In addition, the President is required to repott to the Congress 
any rules and regulations he may formulate in regard to carrying out 
provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act during a 3-year period following the 
start of the Act. Section 14 added that the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other appropriate committees shall 
monitor the implementation of the Act, the affairs of the AIT, U.S.-Taiwan 
economic relations, and U.S. security policies in the Western Pacific. 
Post-Act Developments 
The Congress-Administration compromise seen in the Taiwan Relations Act 
was called into question on Aug. 30, 1979, when Vice President Mondale 
reportedly said in Canton, China, that the Administration planned to end some 
commercial agreements with Taiwan, replacing them with unofficial 
arrangements. Many observers in Taiwan and the United States, including some 
Members of Congress, saw the Vice President's remarks as a reversal of the 
Administration's repeated assurances at the time of U.S.-P.R.C. n ~ r m a l i z a t i ~ n  
that all treaties and agreements between the United States and Taiwan, with 
the exception of the mutual defense treaty would remain in effect after 
normalization. Administration officials have countered that Congress was 
told during deliberations on the Taiwan Relations Act that existing agrements 
CRS- 7 
with Taiwan would have to be altered over time, especially as they expired or 
became obsolete or irrelevant to U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
Meanwhile, the State Dept. announced on Jan. 3 ,  1980, that the Carter 
Administration had decided to sell Taiwan $280 million worth of antiaircraft 
missiles and other defensive weapons, but to reject for now Taipei's request 
for advanced fighter planes. On June 6 ,  1980, Senator Richard Stone 
announced that the State Department had decided to permit U.S. companies to 
discuss the sale of advanced fighter warplanes (the FX) to Taiwan. 
Closer Ties With Taiwan 
Press reports in mid-1980 that the Republican Presidential candidate 
Ronald Reagan favored a restoration of official U.S. ties with Taiwan 
prompted considerable interest and controversy in the United States, China 
and Taiwan. Carter Administration spokesmen warned that such action wou%d 
have a "devastating" impact on U.S. interests in East Asia, leading to a 
downturn in U.S. relations with Peking and a possible revival of military 
tensions in the Taiwan Straits. Peking responded with authoritative press 
commentary critical of any restoration of official U.S. ties with Taiwan. 
Taipei officials were reported to be encouraged by the candidate's views and 
interested in obtaining more information about his China policy. 
The dispute grew during August 1980 when Republican Vice Presidential 
candidate George Bush led a delegation to Peking for talks with Chinese 
leaders amid continued Chinese media criticism of Mr. Reagan's avowed 
interest in closer U.S.-Taiwan ties. Subsequently, Mr. Reagan issued a 
lengthy statement designed to clarify his position on U.S.-Taiwan-China 
relations. 
The controversy emerged anew in December 1980 following the visit of Ray 
Cline, a member of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisory board, to several 
Asian cities, including Taipei. Peking media strongly criticized Cline's 
reported remarks on U.S. policy toward Taiwan, taking fundamental issue with 
the Taiwan Relations Act, which Reagan Administration spokesmen, including 
Cline, emphasized would form the basis of their future policy toward the 
island. 
Peking's criticism of U.S.-Taiwan relations grew in January 1981 when 
Chinese media accused the United States of encouraging the Dutch government 
to build two submarines for Taiwan's navy and of inviting officials from 
Taiwan to the inauguration of President Reagan. The U.S. State Department 
subsequently denied that the United States was involved in the submarine 
deal, and it announced that no representatives from Taiwan had been 
officially invited to the Reagan inauguration. On Feb. 6 ,  1981, the Reagan 
Administration for the first time announced that it would honor the *'solemn 
undertakings" made by the United States in agreeing to normalize relations 
with China in December 1978. The announcement was seen as a gesture to 
China, whose officials had been seeking reassurances of the new 
Administration's commitment to the normalization process. The Chinese were 
reportedly further reassured when Secretary Haig and President Reagan met 
with the Chinese ambassador on Feb. 20 and Mar. 19, 1981, respectively. 
Taiwan's premier told the New York Times on Jan. 23, 1981, that he hoped 
the Reagan Administration would quickly supply Taiwan with defensive arms, 
including advanced fighter aircraft. He called for improvement in 
U.S.-Taiwan relations within the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act, and 
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he suggested unspecified revision of the Act. 
Secretary Haig's visit to China in June 1981 further reassured Chinese 
leaders over U.S. intentions and Administration officials subsequently told 
che press that there was "no urgency" for the United States to provide 
advanced fighter aircraft for sale to Taiwan. 
Economic Relations with the P.R.C. 
The normalization of diplomatic relations has affected U.S. economic ties 
with China in several important areas: 
(a) =Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP)= Tariff Treatment for the P.R.C. Under terms of the Trade Act of 1974, 
MFN status could be granted to the P.R.C. in the context of a Sino-American 
bilateral commercial agreement valid initially for three years after approval 
by Congress. The agreement must, among other things, contain safeguards 
against market disruption, contain agreements for the settlement of 
commercial disputes, make provisions for bilateral consultations, and secure 
protection for the individual property rights of U.S. nationals, equivalent 
to those contained in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property. The Sino-American commercial agreement, which the Carter 
Administration signed with the Chinese in July 1979 and which it submitted to 
Congress for approval in October 1979, met these requirements. 
Moreover, the granting of MFN may not be extended to any nonmarket economy 
that denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate or imposes more 
than nominal exit fees or taxes on documents or individuals. President 
Caster notified Congress that he was waiving these provisions when he 
submitted the Sino-U.S. trade treaty to Congress in October 1979. The 
Congress endorsed the President's action and approved the Sino-U.S. trade 
agreement granting MFN tariff treatment to China on Jan. 24, 1980. 
In regard to GSP, the P.R.C. is clearly a developing country which would - - judged by economic criteria -- qualify also for a U.S. designation as a 
beneficiary developing country (BDC) under the GSP. The benefit accruing to 
a country that is so designated is in having a large array of its exports to 
the United States dutied at a zero-rate (imported duty free). A communist 
country, however, is denied the status of a BCD unless it has been granted 
the MFN status, is a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, and is not dominated or controlled by international communism. 
(The P.R.C. at this time does not qualify under 2 and arguably 3.) 
(b) Blocked Assets/Private Claims. Settlement of the issues of Chinese 
assets blocked in the United States and U.S. private claims against the 
P.R,C. was required before certain steps in U.S.-P.R.C. commercial relations 
could be taken. These issues stem from the blocking by the United States of 
Chinese dollar denominated accounts and other assets on Dec. 17, 1950, after 
P.R.C. military forces entered North Korea, and from the subsequent Chinese 
decree of Dec. 29, 1950, announcing seizure of American public and private 
property in China. 
In 1966, Congress amended the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 
to authorize the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to undertake an 
evaluation of claims by American nationals for losses due to Chinese 
nationalization of property and other assets after Oct. 1 ,  1949. Claims by 
private U.S. citizens and corporations adjudicated by the commission totaled 
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about $197 million. 
The Treasury Department, responsible under the Foreign Assets Control 
Regulations for maintaining control over the blocked Chinese assets, 
undertook a second census of these assets in June 1970. Since the first 
census of 1951, many changes in assets had occurred. The completed census 
placed the value of the assets in June 1970 at $76.5 million. 
These unsettled claims had some impact on U.S.-P.R.C. trade. Unsettled, 
these issues prevented direct shipping and direct airline connections by the 
flag carriers of the P.R.C., owing to the possibility that private claimants 
might seek redress through the courts by attaching ships, aircraft, and other 
P.R.C. property which came into the United States. Direct banking was 
forestalled for the same reason, and the resultant need to work through third 
country correspondent banks was cumbersome for American traders. The sending 
of P.R.C. trade exhibitions to the United States was virtually precluded. In 
addition, the fact that the P.R.C. had nationalized and expropriated 
U.S.-owned property precluded the P.R.C. from obtaining GSP 19 U.S.C. 2462 
(a) (4) . 
Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal reached an agreement with the 
Chinese on the settlement of American claims during his visit to Peking in 
March 1979. Under the agreement, which was officially signed during 
Secretary Krepsf visit in May 1979, the Chinese will pay 41 cents on the 
dollar for a total of $80.5 million. $30 million is to be paid to U.S. 
claimants on Oct. 1 ,  1979. It was also agreed that the U.S. would unblock 
Chinese assets in the U.S. as of Oct. 1, 1979. (On Sept. 30, 1979, China 
announced that the two sides had "recently9' decided to delay implementing the 
claims agreement until Jan. 31, 1980.) Ownership of these assets is unclear 
and will probably be determined through the courts. 
This agreement did not require congressional approval. However, the Trade 
Act of 1974 embodies a section potentially troublesome where the settlement 
of outstanding claims is concerned. Section 408 (19 USC 2438) requires a 
claims settlement, previously negotiated with Czechoslovakia by the State 
Department, to be renegotiated and submitted to the Congress as part of any 
agreement granting to Czechoslovakia the MFN Statute, on the grounds that the 
settlement reached was unfair to U.S. claimants. Although the section 
applies specifically to Czechoslovakia, it may be an indication of broader 
congressional attitudes on claims settlements with other countries. 
(c) Other Trade Issues. There is a possibility that legislation may be 
called for to loosen the controls of U.S. exports to China provided for by 
the Export Administration Act of 1969 as amended, and extended by the Equal 
Export Opportunity Act of 1972 and the Export Administration Amendments of 
1974. (Of course, such loosening can take place entirely by action of the 
executive branch by simply amending the report administration regulations.) 
It would make the controls applicable to exports to the P.R.C. less 
restrictive than those on exports to Soviet bloc states. One purpose of this 
legislation is to authorize controls over the export of goods and technology 
that would contribute to the military potential of communist countries in a 
way that would adversely affect U.S. national security. The legislation also 
declares it to be the policy of the United States to encourage trade in 
nonsensitive items with all nations, including China, with whom we have 
diplomatic and trading relations. Since 1969 the general trend in the 
administration of exports control has been toward liberalization of control 
on all but the most strategically sensitive items. 
In addition, the importation of certain Chinese furs to the United States 
is prohibited by the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended (19 USC 1202, schedule 1, 
part 5, subpart B ,  headnote 4 ) .  
(d) Restrictions on Possible U.S. Aid and Export Creeits to the P.R.C. In 
the wake of normalized U.S.-P.R.C. diplomatic relations, legislation may be 
called for to ease current restrictions on the provision of U.S. aid and 
credits to the P.R.C.. Thus, for example, provisions of PL-480 appear to 
prohibit assistance provided for in the law from being granted to communist 
countries, including China. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 also limits 
the furnishing of almost every type of assistance provided for in that act to 
"friendly countries." However, the act does not explicitly define the term. 
There is a specific ban on furnishing any assistance covered by the act to 
any communist country unless the President issues a narrowly defined waiver. 
Also exempt upon Presidential waiver noted in the previous paragraph are 
programs administered by OPIC. The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 as amended 
prohibits any credit transaction by the bank directly or indirectly involving 
a communist country, unless the President determines that such transaction is 
in the national interest. Moreover, Eximbank credits may in general not be 
granted to non-market countries which curb their citizensf right to emigrate. 
In August 1979, Vice President Mondale told the Chinese that the Carter 
Administration was prepared to establish export-import bank credit 
arrangements for the P.R.C. on a case-by-case basis, up to a total of $2 
billion over a 5-year period, and that the Administration would seek 
congressional authority to provide the guarantees and insurance of OPIC for 
Americans investing in China. Just prior to Mondale's trip, t h e  
Administration decided that China was eligible to receive reimbursable 
assistance from U.S. Government agencies like the Army Corps of Engineers. 
By approving the U.S.-China trade agreement in January 1980, Congress i n  
effect endorsed President Carterfs waiver of the emigration issue in 
considering Eximbank financing for China. In August 1980, Congress also 
passed special legislation amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to 
allow for operations by OPIC with the P.R.C. 
U.S.-China Strategic Relations 
The normalization of U.S.-P.R.C. diplomatic relations strengthened the 
U.S.-P.R.C. strategic understanding -- set forth in the Shanghai Communique - - that the two countries would cooperate to maintain a stable balance of 
power in East Asia that would preclude domination of the region by Soviet 
"hegemony." Significantly, the Dec. 15 announcement by President Carter 
pointedly reiterated the anti-hegemony clause first seen in the Shanghai 
Communique. 
In addition, the establishment of U.S.-P.R.C. diplomatic relations on 
terms agreeable to Peking represented a major diplomatic accomplishment for 
the leaders in China, which reinforced their recent policies of cordiality 
toward the United States and hostility toward the Soviet Union. At the same 
time, it enhanced Sino-American cooperation to a point where Peking appeared 
to have become more helpful in the settlement of such Sensitive strategic 
problems as military confrontation in Korea and international arms control. 
A number of U.S. observers maintain that the United States should 
strengthen its policies which enhance Sino-American strategic cooperation, 
especially against the Soviet Union. They emphasize that the ~ h i n e s e  
preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet rivalry in international affairs has 
clearly resulted in substantial benefits for the United States, and that 
Washington should take initiatives, including the sale of arms and the 
transfer of advanced technology to China (either directly or though America's 
allies in West Rurope and Japan), that will serve to enhance Peking's 
strength vis-a-vis the U.S.S.?.. In particular, members of this school of 
thought maintain that American inte'rests coincide with Chinese interests, 
insofar as they serve to preclude the growth of Soviet international power. 
In Asia, they note, China's posture has allowed the United States to reduce 
costly American military presence without dramatically upsetting the balance 
of power there. Peking's positive view of the United States has also reduced 
the possibility of a major Sino-American conflict in Asia; and it has made 
the Chinese less likely to disrupt the political order and eco-nomic stability 
of noncommunist Asian states -- which are important to the United States -- 
for fear that turmoil there could open opportunities for Soviet expansion. 
In contrast, other observers are less sanguine about Chinese intentions. 
They point out that China remains one of the most unpredictable major powers 
in world affairs, showing in the past a remarkable flexibility regarding the 
building and breaking of alliances, and a willingness to use force, as well 
as conventional diplomacy, in order to achieve foreign objectives. They note 
in particular that the unity of the Chinese leadership remains a major 
unpredictable element in Chinese foreign policy, and that a major shift in 
the policies of either the Soviet Union or the United States could result in 
a substantial change in Chinese policies. Thus, for example, they note that 
if the United States. followed Peking's repeated advice, adopted a decidely 
anti-Soviet tilt in American foreign policy, and sold arms to China the 
result might be a violent Soviet response against the weakest link in the 
Sino-American "alliance" -- China -- that could seriously damage the 
interests of the United States, China, Japan and other states important to 
the United States in the maintenance of stability and prosperity in Asia. 
A third group of observers advocates a "balancedw or "evenhandedn U.S. = 
approach to the Chinese and the Soviets. They judge that the United States 
in the past has gained considerable international benefit within the great 
power triangular relationship by trying simultaneously to improve relations 
with both the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. 
The Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which began in early February 1979, 
heightened awareness of the sensitivity of the triangular relationships. The 
Russians, in general critical of the Administration's China policies, 
expressed concern that the invasion occurred two weeks after Teng's 
Washington visit and voiced displeasure over Blumenthal's visit to Peking, 
which took place while the invasion continued. 
President Carter asserted that normalization would not be affected by the 
Chinese attack on Vietnam, and that the U.S. would not get involved in a 
conflict between Asian communist states. U.S. policy was to deplore both 
China's invasion of Vietnam and Vietnam's earlier invasion of Cambodia. The 
Administration was concerned that the conflict not expand, particularly that 
the Soviet Union, Vietnam's ally, not become directly involved, and urged 
both the Soviet Union and China to exercise restraint. 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan; Brown Visit to China 
The debate on U.S.-Chinese strategic cooperation was influenced heavily by 
altered American and Chinese views of Soviet intentions following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. Peking reacted strongly to 
the Soviet move, stating that it posed a direct threat to Chinese security 
and marked the most serious escalation of Soviet "expansionismw in over a 
decade. The Chinese reaction implied that Peking wished to see the United 
States adopt a more active approach to the Middle East-South Asian region in 
order to counteract the Soviet "threat"; and it signaled what some have seen 
as an even keener Chinese interest in pursuing closer strategic cooperation 
with the United States than in the past -- an interest that was reflected 
during Chinese discussions with Defense Secretary Brown in Peking in January 
1980. It also demonstrated stronger Chinese suspicion of Soviet motives in 
international affairs -- a development that resulted in Chinese suspension sf 
the Sino-Soviet talks begun on the China initiative in the fall of 1979. 
The Soviet action and resulting anti-Soviet furor in the United States 
undercut the arguments of those American policymakers who had favored an 
evenhanded approach toward the Sino-Soviet powers or who were otherwise wary 
of U.S.-China military ties. China's strongly anti-Soviet reaction also 
offset the arguments of those Americans who had been suspicious that China 
could not be trusted to maintain an anti-Soviet posture in coordination with 
the United States. 
A new American approach to the Sino-Soviet powers -- and the apparent 
demise of the former evenhanded strategy -- was apparent in Secretary Brown's 
week-long visit to China in January 1980. Although the full details of the 
visit are still unavailable, several of its accomplishments strongly 
indicated that the United States would side closely with China in common 
efforts to offset Soviet power in Asia. According to various press accounts: 
(1) The United States agreed to sell a ground station enabling 
China to receive data of possible military use from American 
satellites. 
(2) The United States told China of its willingness to sell the 
P.R.C. an array of non-lethal military equipment, which could 
be expanded in the future. 
(3) The United States and China coordinated closely their 
parallel strategies in support of Pakistan and in backing othr 
unspecified efforts -- perhaps including support for anti-Soviet 
Afghan forces -- to thwart Soviet expansion in southwest Asia. 
(4) The United States informed China that it would welcome Chinese 
military help against Vietnam in whatever form Peking might 
choose, if Vietnamese forces crossed from Cambodian territory 
into Thailand. 
Haig Visit to China 
Secretary Haig's visit to China on June 15-17, 1981, further advanced 
Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation against the U.S.S.R. and Soviet-backed 
proxies. It involved talks to coordinate Sino-U.S. policies over such issues 
as Cambodia and Afghanistan, and led to the announcement by the United States 
that it would now be willing to consider the sale of lethal military 
equipment to China, on a case-by-case basis. 
U.S. Military Transfers to China: The announcement that the U.S. was now 
willing to sell lethal military equipment to China caused some observers in 
the Congress and elsewhere to examine what role -- if any -- Congress would 
play in future U.S. exports of defense articles and services to the P.R.C. 
Under present law, arms sales to China would be subject to several 
restrictions, some of which involve the Congress. 
The Arms Export Control Act contains several provisions that would govern 
transfers of defense articles to foreign countries in.cluding: 
(1) Section 38(a), which, among other things, requires that 
defense articles or services to be transferred must have 
an export license issued by the Administration. 
(2) Section 36(b), which allows the Congress to disapprove 
by concurrent resolution the transfer of any "major defense 
equipment" worth $7 million or more, or any other defense 
articles or services worth $25 million or more. 
(3) Sections 38 (b) (3) and 36 (c) , regarding commercial transactions, 
which allows the Congress to disapprove by concurrent resolution 
transfers of "major defense equipment" valued at $100 million 
or more. 
(4) Section 3, which sets forth a series of criteria a country 
must meet in order to be eligible to receive defense items 
under the Act, notably the country's agreement not to make 
unauthorized transfer of defense articles supplied under the 
Act or to permit them to be used for purposes other than those 
for which they were originally furnished. 
At the same time, the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(f), would limit 
the furnishing of U.S. grant military assistance to any Communist country 
unless the President issues a narrowly defined waiver. This section 
specifies that the President must determine and report to Congress that: 
such assistance is vital to U.S. security; the recipient country is not 
controlled by the international communist conspiracy; and such assistance 
will fbrther promote the independence of the recipient country from 
international communism. The phrase "Communist countryn expressly includes 
the P.R.C. 
Section 505(b) of the Act limits the ability of the President to grant 
defense articles at a cost in excess of $3 million in any fiscal year in the 
absence of a waiver by him. According to this section, the President must 
determine that the recipient country conforms to the principles of the U.N. 
Charter, that the articles transferred will be used to defend the country or 
the free world; that the recipient country is making reasonable efforts to 
build up its own defense, and that the increased ability of the recipient 
country to defend itself is important to the security of the United States. 
Regarding the possible sending of military advisors to China, Section 515 
of the Foreign Assistance Act states that no military assistance advisory 
group, military mission, or other organization of U.S. military personnel 
performing similar military advisory functions under the Act or the Arms 
Export Control Act may operate in a foreign country like China unless 
specifically authorized by Congress. 
Meanwhile, Congress in recent years has used various legislative vehicles 
to impose restrictions on arms transfers to specific foreign countries. 
Turkey, Argentina, and Chile are countries which have been affected by these 
restrictions. 
LEGISLATION 
No relevant Eeg,islation in the 97th Congress. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
11/20/81 -- The Far Eastern Economic Review disclosed that Foreign 
Minister Huang Hua had told U.S. leaders in late 
October that China would oppose the sale of any 
weapons to Taiwan until the U.S. makes a public 
commitment to reduce arms sales gradually over a 
fixed period, with a final cut-off in about 1986. 
11/17/81 -- Treasury Secretary Regan met with Deng Xiaoping and 
Zhao Ziyang to discuss U.S.-China economic relations. 
10/31/81 -- P.R.C. Foreign Minister Huang Hua ended two days of talks 
in Washington with no sign of progress on the contentious 
issue of U.S. advanced weapons sales to Taiwan. It was 
also announced that no date has been set for the much-delayed 
trip to the U.S. of Vice Chief of Staff Liu Huaqing. 
b0/21/81 -- Ronald Reagan hosted a luncheon for Chinese Premier Zhao 
Ziyang at Cancun, Mexico. 
10/19/81 -- Sources in Moscow reported that the U-.S.S.R. has proposed 
to China that the two countries revive talks 
about improving relations, or at least reopening the border 
negotiations that were broken off three years earlier. 
10/13/81 -- NCNA criticized remarks made by U.S. Presidential Security 
Advisor Richard Allen concerning support for the 
Taiwan Relations Act. 
09/30/81 -- The Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese leaders 
have recently put more emphases on the development of 
heavy industry, in contrast to the recent practice 
downgrading the importance of heavy industry in favor of 
light industrial production. 
09/30/81 -- Peking issued its most forthcoming proposal to date, 
calling on Taipei leaders to begin talks to promote 
communication between the island and the mainland 
and to lay the groundwork for "peaceful 
reunification." Taipei leaders rejected the offer. 
08/27/81 -- Former President Jimmy Carter ended three days of talks with 
top' Chinese leaders, declaring that the U.S. had never agreed 
to limit the duration of its arms sales to Taiwan, though 
he had committed the U.S. to sell Only "strictly 
defensive" weapons. Carter later told reporters that 
he was "surprised and impressed" by the vehemence of 
Chinese leaders over the Taiwan question. 
08/26/81 -- NCNA sharply attacked House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Chairman Clement Zablocki for reported remarks he made in 
Taiwan on Aug. 22 at the head of a congressional 
delegation. Chairman Zablocki reportedly said that the 
Reagan Administration was willing to sell advanced 
weapons to Taiwan and would reach a decision early next 
year on the sale of F-X jet fighters. 
-- Senator John Glenn said that China's leaders believe 
that Washington had agreed implicitly in 1978 to 
cut sharply or halt weapons Sales to Taiwan after 
Sino-U.S. relations were normalized in 1979. 
-- The Reagan Administration has postponed a visit to 
the United States of a P.R.C. military delegation 
scheduled for August because, according to press 
reports, the Administration has not yet decided how 
far it wants to go in selling arms to China- Later 
reports said the delay was caused by Chinese 
unwillingness to send the delegation at a time of 
uncertainty over U.S.-Taiwan policy. 
-- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs held a hearing looking into the death 
in Taiwan of a professor from Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. 
The professor, a Taiwanese national, died on July 3 
under mysterious circumstances after having been 
interrogated for 13 hours by Taiwan security officers 
over his alleged anti-Taipei activities in the U.S. 
-- People's Daily carried an article Which warned, for 
the first time since Sino-American diplomatic 
normalization, that China might be forced to resort to 
"nonpeaceful methods" to settle the Taiwan problem. 
It critized the U.S. implementation of the Taiwan 
Relations Act because it "encourages the Taiwanese 
authorities to reject peaceful talks and oppose 
peaceful unification." 
-- CCP Vice Chairman Li Xiannian said that China is ready 
to purchase military technology from the-United States 
in order to produce its own arms. He added that it is 
possible China would accept American technicians in 
China to train Chinese in the use of military 
technologies. 
-- Pravda authoritatively condemned Secretary Haig's trip 
to China and his announcement of closer U.S.-China 
military relations as a "dangerous game" that demands 
an unspecified "resolute rebuff." 
-- The House Foreign Affairs Committee's 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs sent a 
letter to President Reagan urging him not to sell 
advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan and to approach 
arms Sales to China With "the greatest caution." 
-- Secretary Haig ended three days talks with 
Chinese leaders in Peking over bilateral issues 
and closer strategic cooperation against the 
Soviet Union and Soviet-backed proxies in such 
areas as Indochina and Afghanistan. Haig 
announced that the U.S. was now willing to consider 
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A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  d e c i d e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  a n y  r e q u e s t s  C h i n a  
may s u b m i t  f o r  U.S. w e a g o n s .  W h i l e  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  t h a t  t h i s  
t h a t  t h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  r e p r e s e n t s  a c h a n g e  f r o m  p a s t  p o l i c y ,  
t h e  o f f i c i a l s  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  n o  d e c i s i o n  h a d  b e e n  made 
a b o u t  a c t u a l l y  s e l l i n g  a r m s  t o  P e k i n g .  
0 6 / 0 5 / 8 1  -- S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  t o l d  t h e  p r e s s  t h a t  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y .  C o u n c i l  h a d  d e c i d e d  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
d a y  t o  p r o m o t e  a s e r i e s  o f  m e a s u r e s  t o  e a s e  e c o n o m i c  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h i n a  a n d  t o  o p e n  t h e  way f o r  
d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  C h i n a  on t h e  s a l e  o f  U.S. w e a p o n s  t o  
P R C .  No d e c i s i o n  was made o n  p o s s i b l e  U.S. e c o n o m i c  
a i d  t o  C h i n a .  
0 5 / 3 1 / 8 1  -- T h e  N e w  York T i m e s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  l e a d i n g  T a i w a n  
o f f i c i a l s  w e r e  b e c o m i n g  w o r r i e d  a n d  i m p a t i e n t  o v e r  t h e  
R e a g a n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  a l l e g e d  s l o w n e s s  t o  i m p r o v e  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  T a i w a n ,  n o t a b l y  b y  d e l a y i n g  a d e c i s i o n  o n  
t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  m o r e  a d v a n c e d  U.S. f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t  f o r  
s a l e  t o  T a i w a n .  
0 5 / 1 3 / 8 1  -- C h i n e s e  m e d i a  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  S e c r e t a r y  H a i g  w i l l  v i s i t  
C h i n a  d u r i n g  h i s  f i r s t  t o u r  o f  E a s t  Asia i n  J u n e  1 9 8 1 .  
W e s t e r n  p r e s s  r e p o r t s  s a id  t h a t  some U.S. o f f i c i a l s  
w a n t  t h e  a g e n d a  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  s a l e  o f  U.S. a n t i - t a n k  
a n d  a n t i - a i r c r a f t  m i s s i l e s  t o  C h i n a .  
0 5 / 1 2 / 8 1  -- C h i n e s e  m e d i a  c r i t i c i z e d  U.S.  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c o u n s e l o r  
Edwin  Meese  f o r  h i s  s t a t e m e n t s  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  
T a i w a n  R e l a t i o n s  A c t  made a t  a p r e s s  b r i e f i n g  t h a t  d a y .  
0 4 / 0 5 / 8 1  -- D e f e n s e  S e c r e t a r y  W e i n b e r g e r  s a i d  i n  L o n d o n  t h a t  t h e  
U.S. r e s p o n s e  t o  S o v i e t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  P o l a n d  
c o u l d  i n c l u d e  t h e  s a l e  o f  U.S. w e a p o n s  t o  C h i n a .  
0 3 / 2 3 / 8 1  -- F o r m e r  P r e s i d e n t  G e r a l d  F o r d  m e t  i n  P e k i n g  w i t h  
Deng X i a o p i n g  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  R e a g a n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
p o l i c y  t o w a r d  C h i n a .  T h e  v i s i t  c a p p e d  s e v e r a l  
r e c e n t  s t e p s  b y  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  a 
f o r m a l  m e e t i n g  w i t h  t h e  C h i n e s e  a m b a s s a d o r  b y  
P r e s i d e n t  R e a g a n  o n  Mar .  1 9 ,  t o  r e a s s u r e  C h i n a  o n  
U . S . - C h i n a  r e l a t i o n s .  F o r d  r e p o r t e d l y  d i s c u s s e d  
t h e  s a l e  o f  U.S. a r m s  t o  T a i w a n  a n d  t o  t h e  P.R.C.  
d u r i n g  h i s  C h i n a  v i s i t .  
02/20/81 -- Secretary of State Haig held his first formal meeting with 
the Chinese ambassador in what Chinese media said was a 
"very friendly" atmosphere. 
02/06/81 -- The Reagan Administration announced for the first time 
that it would honor the "solemn undertakingsw made 
by the United States in agreeing to normalize relations 
with China in December 1978. The announcement, by the 
State Department spokesman, was seen as a gesture to 
China, whose officials had been seeking reassurances 
of the new Administration's commitment to the 
normalization process. 
01/23/81 -- Taiwan's premier told the New York Times that he 
hoped the Reagan Administration would quickly supply 
Taiwan with defensive arms, including advanced fighter 
aircraft. He called for improvement in U.S.-Taiwan 
relations within the framework of the Taiwan 
Relations Act, and he suggested unspecified revision 
of the ~ c t .  
01/19/81 -- The State Department announced that no representative 
from Taiwan had been officially invited to the Reagan 
inauguration. Earlier in January, the Department 
announced that the United States had not been 
involved in an agreement between the Dutch government 
and Taiwan for construction of two submarines for 
Taiwan's navy. Both statements were made in response 
to heavy Chinese press criticism in early January of 
alleged U.S. official invitations to Taiwan 
representatives, and of alleged U.S. involvement in 
the submarine deal. 
01/04/81 -- Senate Deputy Majority Leader Ted Stevens said in Peking 
after two days of talks with Chinese leaders that he would 
not "rule out" U.S. sales of weapons to China as a means 
to Counter Soviet "aggressivenessw in world affairs. 
12/08/80 -- Reports from Taipei showed that the government had 
managed to restore at least partially its past image of 
political stability by successfully conducting elections 
for the national representative organs (Legislative Yuan 
and National Assembly). The elections boosted 
Taiwanese representation in these bodies. Although 
politicians representing the ruling Nationalist Party 
were dominant among the election winners, several prominent 
dissident politicians were also elected. 
12/02/80 -- Peking media strongly criticized the reported remarks on 
U.S.-China-Taiwan relations of Ray Cline, a member of 
Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisory board, during 
Cline's visit to several Asian cities, including Taipei. 
Peking took particular issue with the Taiwan Relations Act, 
which Reagan Administration spokesmen, including Cline, 
said would provide the basis for closer American relations 
with Taiwan in the future. 
11/19/80 -- The trial of ten former Chinese leaders, including 
Mao Zedong's wife and three other members of the "gang 
of four," began in Peking. 
10/22/80 -- China and the U.S. signed an agreement which provides 
for the annual Chinese purchase of at least 6 million 
tons of U.S. grain from 1981 through 1984. 
10/02/80 -- The American Institute in Taiwan and its Taiwan 
counterpart signed an agreement giving each other's 
representatives privileges and immunities traditionally 
enjoyed by diplomats. Peking Strongly protested the 
move in an authoritative press comment and in an unpublished 
foreign ministry protest note. Peking announced that the 
note was given to U.S. Ambassador Woodcock on Oct. 15. 
09/30/80 -- Senator Robert Byrd published an article in the Washington 
Post calling on the U.S. to encourage Peking 
and Taipei to open peace talks. 
09/21/80 -- The New York Times reported that China asked the U.S. for 
permission to buy police equipment from an American 
manufacturer, touching off a dispute in the Carter 
Administration over whether such sales should be permitted 
in view of China's human rights record. 
09/17/80 -- The U.S. and China signed agreements on textile 
trade, consular services, civil aviation, and 
maritime shipping. 
09/10/80 -- A delegation of senior U.S. Defense research experts 
capped a visit to China with a press conference in 
Peking where they announced that the Carter 
Administration has approved hundreds of export 
licenses for the sale of advanced U.S. electronic gear 
and military support equipment to China. 
08/23/80 -- Vice Presidential candidate George Bush ended 
several days of talks with top Chinese leaders 
and departed Peking amid continued Chinese media 
commentaries strongly critical of Republican 
Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's avowed interest 
in closer U.S. ties with Taiwan. 
07/24/80 -- The Washington Post reported that the U.S. and China 
had agreed in principle to a 3-year bilateral trade 
pact to control the export of Chinese textiles to the 
U.S. 
07/10/80 -- President Carter held an hour-long meeting with 
Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng in Tokyo, Japan, where 
both leaders were attending funeral services for 
Japan's former Prime Minister Ohira. The leaders 
reportedly discussed trade and other bilateral issues, 
as well as Soviet and Vietnamese policies in Southwest 
and Southeast Asia. 
06/12/80 -- The Carter Administration warned that any effort to 
restore U.S. official ties with Taiwan would have a 
"devastatingw impact on U.S. interests in East Asia. Two 
days later, an authoritative Chinese press comment 
also condemned a restoration of such ties. The remarks 
came in response to press reports that Republican 
Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan favored a restoration 
of official U.S. relations with Taiwan. 
-- Senator Richard Stone announced that the State Department 
had decided to permit U.S. companies to discuss the sale 
of advanced fighter warplanes to Taiwan. The decision 
came in the wake of complaints by Stone and six other 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a 
letter to President Carter concerning delays by the 
Administration regarding the transfer of a new jet 
fighter to Taiwan. 
05/29/80 -- Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao ended four days of talks 
with top-level U.S. leaders on future Sino-U.S. military 
ties. As a result of the talks, the Carter Administration 
allowed American companies to begin negotiations to sell 
China a wide range of military equipment, including 
air-defense radar, helicopters and transport planes, 
and secure communications equipment. 
04/18/80 -- The Taiwan Garrison Command sentenced eight 
dissidents on sedition charges arising from the 
Kaohsiung riot. Sentences were 12 years for six 
of the defendents, 1 4  years for one, and life 
imprisonment for one. 
04/14/80 -- The People's Republic of China was admitted into the 
International Monetary Fund, and Taiwan was expelled. 
03/17/80 -- Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin began talks 
in Washington with high-level U.S. officials on increased 
U.S.-China security cooperation, especially concerning 
parallel efforts to curb Soviet power in Asia and 
regarding possible U.S. sales of non-lethal military 
equipment to China. At the same time, the Adminstration 
prepared a lengthy list of the types of non-lethai 
military equipment it was prepared to sell to China. 
01/24/80 -- The Congress approved the China-U.S. trade agreement 
granting most-favored-nation tariff treatment to China. 
- - The Pentagon announced that Secretary Brown had told the 
Chinese earlier in the month that the United States was 
willing to sell China non-lethal military equipment, 
including trucks, communications gear, and certain types 
of early-warning radar. An official at the Pentagon 
reportedly added that the list could be expanded in 
time to include transport planes and battlefield computers. 
01/20/80 -- China announced the suspension of talks on normalizing 
Sino-Soviet relations which began in 1979 in Moscow. 
01/13/80 -- Defense Secretary Brown left China after a week of 
talks with Chinese leaders on closer Sino-American 
strategic cooperation in Asia, especially against 
Soviet moves in Afghanistan and Soviet-backed 
expansion by Vietnam and Indochina. 
01/03/80 -- The State Department announced that the Carter 
Administration had decided to sell Taiwan $280 
million Worth of antiaircraft missiles and other 
defense weapons, but to reject for now Taipei's 
request for advanced fighter planes. 
12/31/79 -- Peking's strong reaction to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan included an official warning that the 
Soviet action "poses a direct threat to China's 
security. This cannot but arouse the grave concern 
of the Chinese people." 
12/13/79 -- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals and ordered the district court 
to dismiss the complaint by Senator Goldwater and other 
legislators as not ripe for judicial review or as a 
political question, thereby opening the way for the 
termination of the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan. 
12/10/79 -- Riots occurred in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, in opposition to 
government measures to restrict political dissidence 
on Taiwan. Over 100 people were injured. The 
government subsequently arrested several well known 
dissidents throughout Taiwan. 
11/30/79 -- The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington overturned a 
ruling on Oct. 17, 1979, by the U.S. District Court 
that President Carter had acted unconstitutionally in 
deciding to end the security treaty with Taiwan 
without congressional approval. 
10/23/79 -- President Carter submitted the U.S.-China trade 
agreement to Congress for approval. The President 
also issued a statement declaring that recent 
Chinese actions allowed him to waive the restrictions 
of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment for China. 
10/17/79 -- U.S. District Court Judge Oliver Gasch ruled that 
President Carter had acted unconstitutionally in 
deciding to end the security treaty with Taiwan 
without the approval of either two-thirds of the 
Senate or both Houses of Congress. Senator Goldwater 
and a number of other Members of Congress had filed a 
suit in late December 1978 challenging the legal 
right of the President to unilaterally terminate 
the defense treaty. 
10/15/79 -- The State Department criticized China for sentencing 
a prominent dissident to a 15-year jail term. The 
action marked the first time the Carter Administration 
was known to have formally criticized China's 
treatment of human rights. 
10/01/79 -- The Carter Administration disclosed that Defense 
Secreatary Brown would visit China later in 1979. 
The report of the first visit by a U-S. Defense 
Secretary to China came on the same day that President 
Carter announced U.S. military moves to counter the 
presence of Soviet troops in Cuba. 
09/30/79 -- China announced that it and the United States had 
"recently" decided to delay implementing the 
claims agreement signed in May 1979 until Jan. 31, 1980. 
Q9/29/79 -- Sino-Soviet negotiations designed to improve relations 
between the two communist powers opened in Moscow. 
The start of the talks culminated a 6-month period 
of preliminary diplomatic exchanges between the two sides 
on the agenda, location and diplomatic level of 
the negotiations. 
09/01/79 -- The Baltimore Sun reported that Vice President Mondale 
had indicated, while visiting Canton, China, the 
previous day, that the Administration planned to end 
some official commercial agreements with Taiwan, 
replacing them with unofficial arrangements. Some 
observers in Taiwan and the United States said that 
the Vice President's remarks constituted a reversal 
of the Administration's repeated assurances at the 
time of U.S.-P.R.C. normalization that all treaties 
between the United States and Taiwan, with the exception 
of the mutual security treaty, would remain in effect 
after normalization. Administration spokesman 
countered that the Congress had been informed during 
deliberations on the Taiwan Relations Act that some 
agreements would have to be changed, especially a s  
they expired or became obsolete or irrelevant to 
U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
08/29/79 -- Vice President Mondale left Peking after several 
days of meetings with top Chinese leaders and 
the signing of Sino-American accords on cultural 
exchanges and cooperation in hydroelectric power. 
Mondale told the Chinese that the Administration this 
year would seek the approval of Congress for the 
recently negotiated U.S.-China trade agreement and 
for OPIC guarantees for Americans investing in 
China, and he added that the United States was 
prepared to establish export-import bank credit 
arrangements for the P.R.C. on a case-by-case 
basis up to a total of $2 billion over a 5-year 
period. 
07/20/79 -- The Far Eastern Economic Review disclosed that earlier 
in July the U.S. Defense Department had sent the 
Congress formal notification of the sale of equipment 
to Taiwan involving 48 F-5E fighter aircraft, 
500 Maverick air-to-ground missiles and other equipment 
worth $240 million. 
07/07/79 -- The United States and China signed a trade agreement which, 
if endorsed by Congress, will provide most-favored-nation 
tariff treatment for China. 
06/06/79 -- By a vote of 59 to 35, the Senate passed a nonbinding 
resolution that "approval of the U.S. Senate is required 
to terminate any mutual defense treaty between the United 
States and another nation." While it did not specifically 
mention Taiwan, the resolution was seen as a rebuke 
of President Carter's decision ending the U.S. defense 
treaty with Taiwan. The Senate resolution was also related 
to a Federal judge's decision earlier that day to dismiss 
a suit brought by 25 present and former Members of Congress 
against the President's decision on the Taiwan treaty. 
The judge reportedly indicated that he could take no 
action on the suit unless the Senate or the Congress 
formally showed its disapproval of the President's 
decision to end the treaty with Taiwan. 
05/14/79 -- Secretary of Commerce Kreps capped her visit to 
China by initialing a Sino-American trade agreement. 
Earlier in her visit, Secretary Kreps signed a 
U.S.-P.R.C. agreement on financial claims and 
frozen assets which had been initialed during 
Secretary Blumenthalrs visit to China in March 1979. 
04/10/79 -- President Carter signed the U.S.-Taiwan Relations 
Act (P.L. 96-8). 
63/02/79 -- Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal announced at the 
end of his week-long visit to Peking that the Chinese 
had agreed to pay Americans $80.5 million in settlement 
of outstanding claims. 
03/01/79 -- Treasury Secretary Blumenthal presided over the opening 
of the U.S. embassy in Peking as U.S.-P.R.C. relations 
were formalized, 
02/26/79 -- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmed 
Leonard Woodcock as the first ambassador to the 
People's Republic of China. 
02/17/79 -- Charging numerous border incursions by Vietnamese, 
tne Chinese announced they had launched a 
ncounterattackv in order to teach the Vietnamese 
a lesson. The U.S. sought to prevent eruption 
into a wider war by calling on both nations to 
withdraw their troops behind their own borders 
and cautioning the Soviet Union against direct 
involvement. 
02/15/79 -- Taiwan agreed to the establishment of a new organization 
to carry on its relations with the U.S., to be 
called the Coordination Council for North American 
Affairs. 
02/04/79 -- U.S. and P.R.C. leaders hailed the normalization of 
their diplomatic relations during Chinese Vice Premier 
Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to the United States from 
Jan. 29 to Feb. 4, 1979. The visit resulted in the 
signing of bilateral agreements on science and technology 
and on cultural exchange, the reaching of understandings 
regarding cooperation in education, agriculture, and 
space, and an accord on high energy physics. Also an 
agreement was signed on the mutual establishment of 
consular relations. The two sides announced in a 
joint press communique that.they had agreed to conclude 
trade, aviation, and shipping agreements, and they used 
the communique to reiterate their joint opposition 
to international "hegemony." 
12/15/78 -- President Carter announced that the United States 
would establish diplomatic relations with the P . R . C ,  
as of Jan. 1, 1979, would break its diplomatic ties 
with the Nationalist Chinese administration on Taiwan 
on that date, and would terminate its defense treaty 
with Taiwan a year later. 
11/24/78 -- The New York Times reported that the Carter 
Administration had approved a request by Prance to 
sell an American-designed nuclear power plant to China, 
11/06/78 -- The State Department announced that it was offering 
to sell Taiwan 48 F-5E jet fighters equipped 
with Maverick air-to-ground missiles. The Department 
noted that the United States had turned down Taiwan's 
request for more powerful American planes with longer 
ranges, like the F-4, F-16 or F-18. 
11/03/78 -- Secretary of State Vance said that the United States 
would not sell military weapons to China but indicated 
that the United States would not oppose the sale 
of military weapons to China by West European countries. 
18/31/78 -- The Washington Star reported that the United States 
had agreed to sell China a communications satellite 
that will improve telephone and television links in 
China, 
09/08/78 -- The Senate passed legislation which would have 
the effect of facilitating U.S. grain sales to 
the P.R.C. The legislation subsequently was passed 
by the House and signed by President Carter. 
07/25/78 -- The Senate passed, by a vote of 94-0, an amendment 
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the 
Arms Export Control Act expressing the sense of 
the Senate that there should be prior consultations 
between the Senate and the executive branch on any 
proposed policy changes affecting the continuation 
in force of the U.S.-R.O.C. mutual defense treaty. 
The legislation subsequently was passed by the 
House and signed by President Carter. 
07/05/78 -- The Carter Administration announced that the United 
States will permit Israel to sell up to 60 Kfir 
jet fighters -- which are equipped with U.S.-made 
engines -- to Taiwan. 
0 5 / 2 3 / 7 8  -- N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  A d v i s e r  B r z e z i n s k i  d e p a r t e d  
P e k i n g  a f t e r  t h r e e  d a y s  o f  t a l k s  w i t h  C h i n e s e  l e a d e r s  
Hua G u o f e n g ,  T e n g  H s i a o - p i n g ,  a n d  Huang Hua.  
0 5 / 0 9 / 7 8  -- A v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  b o r d e r  b y  S o v i e t  b o r d e r  
g u a r d s  p r o m p t e d  t h e  f i r s t  p u b l i c  e x c h a n g e  b e t w e e n  
Moscow a n d  P e k i n g  o v e r  a  s p e c i f i c  , b o r d e r  i n c i d e n t  i n  
f o u r  y e a r s .  
1 0 / 3 1 / 7 7  -- S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  C y r u s  V a n c e  t o l d  e d i t o r s  o f  U.S. 
News a n d  W o r l d  R e p o r t  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  b e  a " g r e a t  m i s t a k e "  
f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  s u p p l y  m i l i t a r y  e q u i p m e n t  o r  
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  e i t h e r  C h i n a  o r  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  
a n d  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  n e i t h e r  c o u n t r y  h a d  
e x p r e s s e d  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  a c q u i r i n g  s u c h  e q u i p m e n t .  
0 9 / 0 6 / 7 7  -- V i c e  P r e m i e r  T e n g  H s i a o - p i n g  was r e p o r t e d  t o  h a v e  t o l d  
v i s i t i n g  U.S. j o u r n a l i s t s  t h a t  r e p o r t s  o f  p r o g r e s s  o n  
t h e  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  o f  U.S. -P.R.C.  r e l a t i o n s  d u r i n g  
S e c r e t a r y  V a n c e f s  v i s i t  t o  C h i n a  i n  A u g u s t  w e r e  w r o n g .  
T e n g  a l s o  c l a i m e d  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  F o r d  h a d  p r o m i s e d  
d u r i n g  a v i s i t  t o  P e k i n g  i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 5  t h a t  i f  h e  
was r e e l e c t e d  h e  w o u l d  b r e a k  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
t h e  C h i n e s e  n a t i o n a l i s t  g o v e r n m e n t  o n  T a i w a n  a n d  
e s t a b l i s h  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  P e k i n g .  Mr. F o r d  
s u b s e q u e n t l y  d e n i e d  t h a t  a n y  s u c h  p r o m i s e  h a d  b e e n  
made.  
0 8 / 2 5 / 7 7  -- S e c r e t a r y  V a n c e  c a p p e d  h i s  f o u r - d a y  v i s i t  t o  C h i n a  
w i t h  a p r i v a t e  m e e t i n g  w i t h  C h i n e s e  P a r t y  C h a i r m a n  
Hua G u o f e n g .  V a n c e  h a d  e a r l i e r  h e l d  t a l k s  w i t h  
V i c e  P r e m i e r  T e n g  H s i a o - p i n g  a n d  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  
H u a n g  Hua .  
0 7 / 1 1 / 7 7  -- L e o n a r d  W o o d c o c k ,  f o r m e r  p r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
A u t o  W o r k e r s  U n i o n ,  was s w o r n  i n  a s  c h i e f  o f  t h e  U.S.  
L i a i s o n  O f f i c e  i n  P e k i n g .  
1 0 / 2 9 / 7 6  -- T h e  U.S. S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  a l l o w  
t h e  p r i v a t e  s a l e  o f  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  C y b e r  1 7 2  c o m p u t e r s  
a n d  s u p p o r t  s y s t e m s  t o  C h i n a  a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  
1 0 / 0 6 / 7 6  -- C h i a n g  C h i n g ,  M a o ' s  w i d o w ,  a n d  t h r e e  o t h e r  r a d i c a l  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  P o l i t b u r o ,  Wang Hung-wen ,  
C h a n g  C h u n - c h i a o ,  a n d  Yao Wen-yuan w e r e  p l a c e d  u n d e r  
h o u s e  a r r e s t .  
0 9 / 0 9 / 7 6  -- T h e  d e a t h  o f  C h a i r m a n  Mao a t  8 2  was o f f i c i a l l y  a n n o u n c e d  
i n  P e k i n g .  
1 2 / 0 1 / 7 5  - 1 2 / 0 5 / 7 5  -- A v i s i t  b y  P r e s i d e n t  F o r d  t o  C h i n a  p r o d u c e d  n o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a n n o u n c e d  c h a n g e s  i n  U . S . - C h i n a  r e l a t i o n s .  A 
j o i n t  c o m m u n i q u e  was n o t  i s s u e d .  
1 0 / 2 3 / 7 5  -- S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  H e n r y  K i s s i n g e r  c o n c l u d e d  f o u r  d a y s  o f  
t a l k s  w i t h  C h i n e s e  o f f i c i a l s .  
0 4 / 0 5 / 7 5  -- P r e s i d e n t  C h i a n g  K a i - s h e k  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  C h i n a  d i e d  a t  
the age of 87. 
10/09/74 -- The Senate voted to repeal the 1955 Formosa Resolution 
(in the State Dept./USIA Authorization Act, FY75, 
P.L. 93-475, Oct. 26, 1974). 
11/14/73 -- A joint U.S.-P.R.C. communique was issued at the conclusion 
of a visit by Secretary of State Kissinger to China. 
The Chinese noted that the normalization 
of relations could be realized "only on the basis of 
Confirming the principle of one China." 
02/22/73 -- Peking and Washington announced in a communique that 
liaison offices would be established in the two capitals. 
02/21/72 -- President Nixon began a seven-day visit to China. 
The United States and China 
issued a joint communique on February 27 in Shanghai which 
indicated that negotiations would c o n t ~ n u e  toward 
normalization of relations, efforts would be made 
to increase the level of trade, and bilateral exchanges 
would be increased. The United States said it would in time 
withdraw all American forces and military installations 
from Taiwan, and, moreover, it did not challenge the 
position that there was but one China, of which Taiwan was a 
part, or the prospect of the Chinese themselves settling 
the Taiwan question. 
10/25/71 -- The United Nations General Assembly voted 76 to 35, with 
17 abstentions, to seat Peking and expel Taiwan. 
07/15/71 -- Peking announced that President Nixon had accepted Premier 
Chou En-lairs invitation to visit China. The 
Peking broadcast announced that Dr. Henry Kissinger 
had held talks in Peking with Chou En-lai 
from July 9 to 11. 
06/b0/7P --The United States announced the end of the 21-year embargo 
on trade with the People's Republic of China. 
05/07/71 -- The United States removed all controls on dollar 
transactions with the P.R.C. (except previously blocked 
accounts). 
04/07/71 -- China extended an invitation to the U.S. table tennis 
team to visit China. 
03/15/71 -- The United States announced that U.S. passports no longer 
needed special validation for travel to mainland China. 
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